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Abstract: Empirical literature shows that ex-ante asymmetries across players arise quite naturally 
in social network formation. In this work, a very general kind of heterogeneity is considered, and 
two different models of network formation are introduced corresponding to different kind of 
disutility of establishing direct connections. These models are games with vector valued payoffs 
which are here investigated by using the concept of Pareto-Nash equilibrium and its refinements.  
 
Keywords: social network formation, one sided networks, heterogeneity, multicriteria games, 
Pareto Nash equilibrium, refinements. 
 
The processes of information diffusion within a group of individuals and their implication on how 
they affect social learning have attracted increasing interest in the economics literature. The analysis 
of these issues has developed in various directions; for instance, a first approach considers non-
strategic agents while, in the literature on social networks, individuals are identified with the 
vertices of a graph and create strategically  relationships (links) within the others in such a way that 
the level of connectedness of the network determines the benefits accruing them. The basic 
assumption behind models of network formation is that establishing and maintaining connections 
with other individuals is costly. As a consequence, individuals limit the number or the intensity of 
their connections and then network structures develop from agents' comparison of disutility (costs) 
versus benefits of connection. In the seminal papers by Jackson and Wolinski (1996)  and by Dutta 
and Mutuswami (1997)  two-sided link formation has been investigated, in other words a situation 
in which two agents must agree on the decision to form a mutual link, but defection by one agent is 
sufficient to break the link;  such notion of  pairwise stability has been analyzed in a cooperative 
theoretic game framework. In  Bala and Goyal (2000), one-sided link formation has been studied, 
this is the case where an individual  can form links with the others autonomously and incurring in 
the cost of connection. This situation allows a description in terms of non cooperative theoretic 
game models and network stability has been studied in terms of Nash equilibrium concept and its 
refinements. In their paper, both the one-way and two-way flow of benefits (which correspond to 
directed and not directed graphs) are considered, and agents are supposed to be symmetric 
(homogeneous)  and maximizing real valued payoff functions depending on two variables: the 
number of people (directly or indirectly) accessed and the number of links the agent forms himself. 
Moreover payoffs are assumed to be strictly increasing in the first variable and strictly decreasing in 
the second one.  
The first important result in Bala and Goyal is that a Nash network is either empty or “tw-
connected”, i.e., there is a path between any couple of players, and satisfying the “no cycles” 
property. However, it turns out that there is a great number of Nash network so, as stated in Bala 
and Goyal, “multiplicity of equilibria motivates an examination of a stronger equilibrium concept”. 
They focus on the concept of strict Nash equilibrium which is characterized by the uniqueness of 
the best reply correspondences in equilibrium. They find out that in the one-way flow model the 
unique not empty (no links) strict Nash network is the wheel, that is, a connected network in which 
each player creates and receives one link. In the two-way flow model the unique not empty strict 
Nash network is the center-sponsored star, that is, a network in which one player, the center, forms 
links with all the other players.  
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A common assumption in this first literature of network formation is homogeneity, in the sense that 
all decision makers conjecture that others receive information or establish links of equivalent value. 
Empirical literature shows that ex-ante asymmetries across players arise quite naturally in reality. 
For instance, agents might suppose the others are informed differently (information has different 
values) or differ in communication and social skills (forming links is cheaper for some individuals 
as compared to others). A first step in the investigation of the effects of agents heterogeneity in the 
network formation literature has been introduced by  Johnson and Gilles (2000) in which ``spatial 
costs'' are considered, representing geographical, social or individual differences and extending the 
two-sided network formation model of Jackson and Wolinsky (1996). Other papers investigate the 
impact of ex ante player heterogeneity on one sided network formation. In particular, in Galeotti et 
al. (2006), it is considered heterogeneity (in terms of the costs of linking and the values of accessing 
other players) in shaping the equilibrium architecture of one-sided two flow networks. 
In this paper a different kind of heterogeneity is taken into account: agents are not able to valuate a 
priori the type of information coming from the others (for instance this can be caused by uncertainty 
with unknown distributions); this implies that there is no a-priori opinion on the relative importance 
of benefits that each player may get from connection with the others. In other words, it is studied 
the situation in which each player has an utility function associated to each other agent and which 
depends (increasingly) on the intensity of connection; moreover, these payoffs are not a-priori 
comparable. Finally, the cost of forming a link may differ qualitatively. In fact, on one hand, it can 
be relative to the benefits  coming from the agent linked and we refer to these costs as the  rd-
networks (relative disutilities). This is the case, for instance, of costs depending on the same 
uncertainty of the benefits coming from the agent linked. Another approach is to consider ad-
networks (absolute disutilities) in which costs are comparable each other but not comparable with 
benefits of connection. 
Summarizing, agents are endowed with vector valued payoff functions. In the rd-networks these 
payoffs have as many components as it is the number of each player's opponents. For every player i, 
the component of the payoff associated to player j is increasing in the level of connection between i 
and j and decreasing in the level of investment of player i in the direct link with player j. In the ad-
networks  payoffs have as many components as it is the number of each player's opponents plus 
one. For every player i the component of the payoff associated to player j  is increasing in the level 
of connection between i and j while the additional component represents costs and it is given by  the 
(weighted) sum of levels of investment of player i in the direct links with the others. Stability of  
network structures is analyzed in terms of Pareto Nash equilibria (also called Multicriteria Nash 
equilibria) and their refinements (see the seminal paper by Shapley (1957), or also further results 
and references in  Borm et al. (1999), Wang (1990) and De Marco and Morgan (2007)). Firstly, it is 
considered the classical assumption that players can choose only between forming links or not. It 
turns out that in the rd-networks the properties of “tw connectedness” and “no cycles” (“minimally 
connectedness”) partially characterize Pareto Nash equilibria (similarly to the classical two-way 
model in Bala and Goyal). Morever, the center sponsored star is here completely characterized by a 
refinement of Pareto Nash equilibria called ideal equilibrium (see Voornerveld et al. (2000)) in 
which the strategy of each player realizes the maximum of each component of his payoff function 
(also this result is in line with the corresponding result in Bala and Goyal).  In the ad-networks, the 
results found are substantially different in fact, on one hand, Pareto Nash characterize only the “no 
cycles” property and simple examples show that a Pareto Nash can be disconnected. Morever 
examples show that ideal equilibria and “strong Nash”-like refinements (cooperative solutions) are 
ineffective in ad-networks. However, it turns out that the “tw-connectedness” is characterized by an 
extension to multicriteria games of the friendliness equilibrium concept (investigated in  De Marco 
and Morgan (2008;a,b)). Recall also that the general property called friendly behavior has been 
defined and used  by Rusinowska (2002) for equilibrium selection in some 2-players bargaining 
models. Friendliness equilibria are based on a property of robustness of the equilibrium with respect 
to a particular class of deviations: a player is supposed to move away from the equilibrium even 
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only to guarantee a better payoff to the others and feasible deviations are unilateral and only 
towards Nash equilibria. 
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